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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

R.D. Merrill Co. v. State Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 969 P.2d 458
(Wash. 1999) (holding change in seasonal water right and transfers of
unperfected groundwater permits permissible, the public trust doctrine
argument invalid, the change or transfer of the unperfected irrigation right
and exception to water right relinquishment was properly denied; and
overturning the summary judgment motion previously granted by the State
Pollution Control Board).
This decision in the Washington Supreme Court centered on R.D.
Merrill Company's ("Merrill") applications for water right changes in
order to develop a cross-country ski resort. The Okanogan Wilderness
League ("OWL") challenged the applications at each stage: before the
Department of Ecology ("Department"), the State Pollution Control Board
("Board"), and the Superior Court.
The court first agreed with OWL and noted that a change in water right
under RCW 90.03.380 may not be determined by historic perfected use,
and may not be granted when detrimental to other appropriators' rights.
The Department must look at the existence and extent of beneficial use of
the water right, considering issues of relinquishment and abandonment.
OWL maintained that seasoaal use also limits the transfer or change in a
water right under this statute. Noting that western common law takes into
account not only time of use, but quantity, the court stated that although
RCW 90.03.380 does not expressly address a change from seasonal to year
round use, it "is implicitly covered." Without discussing whether such a
change must be detrimental to other water rights, as OWL maintained in
this case, the court simply upheld the approval for change. The Board did
reduce the quantity of change requested from one-acre foot to .67 acre-feet
per year.
The argument over whether to allow the transfer of two unperfected
groundwater permits focused on an application of laws and the time the
Department may use to determine availability of such water for use. The
Department maintained the transfer proper under RCW 90.44.100, which
allows for a groundwater permit amendment when the water has not been
put to beneficial use. A debate in lower court and the Board and
Department decisions centered on whether or not RCW 90.03.380
governed the transfer. This statute requires beneficial use to grant a
change or transfer of the right. The court explained that RCW 90.03.380
does not cover unperfected rights, the kind of water right at issue here.
The court also decided that the Department only needs to find the water
available for appropriation at the time of the original permit application,
not at the time of the application for change. This decision came in
Merrill's favor, since the Department granted, and the Board affirmed, the
transfer of two water permits for water unperfected at the time of the
application.
OWL challenged the above decisions by the Department (and Board) as
violations of the public trust doctrine. The court summarily dismissed this
argument. First, the court noted that no precedent allowed the application
of the doctrine to non-navigable waters or groundwater. Instead, the court
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pointed to state water codes, which "contain numerous provision intended
to protect public interests," and rejected OWL's argument that the doctrine
be used as "additional canon of construction" for interpreting the water
code. Second, the court stated that the public trust duty falls on the state,
not an agency. Here, the Department's enabling statute contains no grant
of authority to take on the state's duties under the doctrine.
In OWL's favor, the court upheld a Board decision to deny the
developers a change for an irrigation right. The superior court reversed
the Board's decision despite evidence that the right went unperfected. The
original water right applied to a homestead property, and the owners later
applied for diversion of that water for irrigation. The Board found no
evidence of actual diversion or appropriation of water under that
application. Since no irrigation right ever existed, the Board denied the
developer's application for change on the right, and this court agreed.
Finally, the court found the Board's granting of partial summary
judgment to Merrill improper. The Board decided OWL failed to meet its
burden of proof concerning the abandonment or relinquishment of another
irrigation right, which Merrill attempted to change. Merrill attempted to
deny findings of relinquishment by claiming statutory exceptions. First,
the Board gave Merrill an exception based on the fact that existing legal
proceedings excused nonuse of the water right. The court then remanded
the issue for further factual determination, explaining that the Board used
the wrong standard and that legal proceedings must be the direct cause of
nonuse.
Merrill claimed a second exception based on water rights claimed for
future development. To prove this type of "excused nonuse" the future
development must have a firm plan and "be fixed prior to the end of the
[allowable] five year period of nonuse." Merrill asserted a firm plan
within date restrictions based upon feasibility studies and the purchase of
property, and the court held this evidence insufficient, citing beneficial use
as a measuring stick. The debate then turned on whether Merrill put the
irrigation right to beneficial use within an allotted fifteen-year time period.
Since the Board granted partial summary judgment despite OWL raising
material issues of fact on nonuse and before it could give pertinent
evidence on abandonment and relinquishment of the irrigation right in
question, the court held the judgment improper.
In this case neither side won every issue. Merrill kept the changes and
transfer in water rights originally granted by the Department and the
Board, but lost a change to an unperfected right and partial summary
judgment in their favor. OWL did not convince the court that the
Department could use the public trust doctrine when making water code
decisions, but will get a chance to present evidence of relinquishment and
abandonment on one of Merrill's applications for change in water right.
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